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After a long and hard-fought trial, a jury has convicted your
client of kidnapping. A statute defines kidnapping as the forci-
ble taking or holding of another against that person's will. The
statute permits the court to punish your client by twenty years
in prison for the kidnapping. If the judge at sentencing finds
your client accomplished the kidnapping with a weapon, the
statute permits thirty years imprisonment.
You and your client now stand before the judge who will im-
pose sentence. The judge announces she has read affidavits the
prosecutor supplied her for sentencing. On the basis of those
submissions, the judge believes that your client probably used a
weapon during the kidnapping. She makes a finding that he did
so. You object:
Your honor, I understand I am bound by the jury's verdict with respect
to the kidnapping, although neither my client nor I agree with it. But
the jury said nothing about the use of a weapon. The verdict addresses
only what the indictment charged. The prosecutor did not include any
mention of a weapon in the indictment. Because the indictment did not
raise the issue of a weapon, Your Honor never instructed the jury on the
matter. Had we been given notice, we could have prepared our defense at
trial in light of a complete and formal accusation about the weapon. We
had no opportunity to do so. Moreover, at trial the prosecution called no
witnesses to establish my client used a weapon. Had the prosecutor done
so, I could have vigorously confronted those witnesses and cross-
examined them. I also could have called witnesses to refute them. We
had no chance to do that. Had the prosecution charged my client with
using a weapon, due process would have required the prosecution to
carry the burden of proving its charge beyond a reasonable doubt. By
t Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College; A.B. Fordham University, 1969; J.D.,
Boston College Law School, 1977. I gratefully acknowledge the helpful criticisms made of
earlier drafts of this article by Boston College Law School Professors Sharon Beckman,
Michael Cassidy, Phyllis Goldfarb, James Rogers, and Dean Avian Soifer. Most espe-
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only raising the matter at sentencing, the prosecution hopes to escape
that burden. My client is now deprived of the verdict of a jury on the is-
sue of using a weapon. My client should not lose his due process rights
guaranteed him at trial because the prosecutor chose to raise the use of
a weapon only at sentencing. Consequently, I ask Your Honor either to
disregard the issue of whether my client used a weapon, or to accord my
client all the due process protections he would have had if the prosecu-
tion had formally charged him with the use of a weapon.
The sentencing judge responds:
Counsel, your requests are denied. You seem to think we are here to try
your client. We've done that. You lost. We are here now simply to impose
punishment for his crime. The statute allows me to impose a sentence of
twenty years for kidnapping, but thirty years if I find the defendant used
a weapon. I have found your client probably used a weapon. I impose the
maximum sentence of thirty years in prison. Next case.
Was your client entitled to the due process protections of a
criminal trial for the use of a weapon before the judge added ten
years to the defendant's sentence for kidnapping? Appellate
courts say no. This Article argues the contrary. When a statute
permits a court to punish more harshly due to an aggravating
factor than it could without the factor (for example, thirty years
for kidnapping with a weapon rather than twenty years for kid-
napping without a weapon), the due process protections of a
criminal trial should apply to the aggravating factor before a
judge can impose the lengthier punishment. This Article will re-
fer to statutes that permit greater punishment for the aggra-
vated commission of a crime as "maximum-enhancing statutes."
The term "maximum" refers to the greatest punishment the
statute permits for commission of the crime in its unaggravated
form (for example, twenty years for kidnapping without the use
of a weapon).
Part I considers the Supreme Court's rationale for refusing
to apply full due process safeguards to other types of sentencing
schemes. This background will reveal the unique quality of max-
imum-enhancing statutes and establish why the due process
protections of a criminal trial should apply to sentencing under
aximum-enhancing statutes. Part I, therefore, undertakes to
explain courts' rationales to deny criminal defendants full crimi-
nal due process under discretionary sentencing, mandatory min-
imum sentencing, and guideline sentencing. Part II focuses on
maximum-enhancing statutes. It isolates and analyzes the
courts' rationales for denying criminal defendants full criminal
due process under them. Part J- argues that no convincing ratio-
nale justifies reduced due process for maximum-enhancing stat-
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utes, no matter what one's views of the due process reasoning
underlying other sentencing structures. Part IH will argue that,
if courts applied full criminal due process protection to maxi-
mum-enhancing factors, it is unlikely that legislatures would try
to avoid the safeguards by artful drafting of criminal statutes.
The Article will conclude that courts should apply the full pro-
tections appropriate to a criminal trial to findings that enhance
a maximum sentence.
I THE RATIONALE FOR DENYING DuE PROCESS PROTECTIONS AT
SENTENCING
A. Williams v. New York:' The Rationale for Denying Due
Process Protections at Discretionary Sentencing
A vast difference exists between an accused's rights at trial
and a convicted defendant's rights at sentencing. At trial, a
criminal defendant is entitled to the full panoply of due process
protections: the right to counsel 2 notice of the charges,3 to com-
pulsory process,4 to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses,5 to trial by jury,6 and the right to have the prosecution
prove the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.7
After conviction, a defendant stands in a radically different posi-
tion. These due process guarantees vanish except for the right
to counsel.
A traditional criminal statute defines the elements of a
crime and sets out a maximum penalty permitted for its com-
mission. A judge has the discretion to impose any penalty
within the maximum the statute prescribes. The statute does
not require the judge to make any fact-finding before imposing
sentence. The jury's finding that the defendant committed the
elements of the crime permits the judge, without more, to im-
pose the maximum penalty, if the judge wishes.
The United States Supreme Court set out the rationale for
denying due process claims under discretionary sentencing in
1. 337 US. 241 (1949).
2. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
3. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 766 (1962).
4. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
5. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 US. 400, 403 (1965).
6. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399
US. 66, 69 (1970).
7. In re Winship, 397 US. 358, 364 (1970). A defendant is also entitled to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335. This is the only trial right that
also attaches at sentencing. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 US. 128, 136 (1967).
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Williams v. New York. 8 The case involved a traditional discre-
tionary sentencing statute. In Williams, a jury had convicted the
defendant of murder and recommended a life sentence. The
murder statute permitted a maximum sentence of death, if the
judge found it appropriate. At sentencing, the judge considered
information the probation department and other sources had
supplied against the defendant. The information included accu-
sations of other crimes for which the defendant had not been
convicted and an allegation that he had a "morbid sexuality."
The defendant had no opportunity to confront, cross-examine, or
rebut the sources who had supplied the information used
against him at sentencing. The judge relied on this information
to reject the jury's recommendation of life and instead to impose
a death sentence. The Supreme Court noted that "[w]ithin limits
fixed by statutes, New York judges are given a broad discretion
to decide the type and extent of punishment for convicted de-
fendants. Here, for example, the judge's discretion was to sen-
tence to life imprisonment or death. 9 The New York statute fur-
ther provided a sentencing judge could consider "information
about the convicted person's past life, health, habits, conduct,
and mental and moral propensities."10 According to New York
procedural policy, consideration of such factors was intended to
aid judges in intelligently exercising their discretion. New York
permitted its judges to consider such information, even though
it came from sources outside the courtroom and, therefore, from
those whom a defendant had no opportunity to confront or
cross-examine.
Williams challenged the New York sentencing scheme argu-
ing due process entitled him to confront and cross-examine the
sources used against him at sentencing. The Supreme Court re-
jected Williams's challenge, noting that historically, a sentencing
judge could "exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types
of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and the
extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law,"
including affidavits from persons not appearing in court and the
judge's personal knowledge."' A sentencing judge must select an
appropriate sentence within the maximum limit set by statute.
A judge needs "the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics"12 to perform this task.
8. 337 US. 241 (1949).
9. Id. at 244-45.
10. Id. at 245.
11. See id. at 246.
12. Id. at 247.
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According to the Court, sentencing information helps a
judge decide whether to do what the conviction already entitles
the judge to do. By virtue of Williams's conviction alone, the
judge had the power to sentence Williams to death. He could do
so without any hearing and without giving any reason. 3 Infor-
mation about Williams's other crimes and his morbid sexuality
simply helped the judge to decide the defendant should die. Ab-
sent the information, the judge could still sentence the defend-
ant to death.
The Williams rationale for denying due process claims at
discretionary sentencing fails to address an obvious problem.
The Williams Court blinks away any difference between the
judge who says, "I sentence you to death for this murder" and
the judge who says, "I sentence you to death for this murder be-
cause I believe reports that you committed other bad acts and
have a morbid sexuality." The Williams Court saw no difference
between choosing a punishment on solidly proven grounds and
one based on untested allegations.
The difference, however, is clear to any defendant. For Wil-
liams, the difference was between life and death. Williams may
have lived but for the untested information in sentencing affida-
vits.14 In a defendant's eyes, the reliability of the sentencing in-
formation is as critically important as evidence introduced
against him at trial. For the Williams Court, the sentencing
finding was a "collateral issue"15 not important enough to war-
rant the due process protections that attach at trial. Only one
13. See id. at 251.
14. Arguably, full due process protections should accompany a finding of such con-
sequence. In fact, Congress has provided extensive procedural safeguards in death-
penalty proceedings. The Federal Death Penalty Act, 1 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (1994), enti-
ties a defendant to notice of aggravating circumstances and a jury determination, based
on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factor exists. The Act demon-
strates that the provision of greater procedural safeguards does not impose an unman-
ageable burden on sentencing practice. State death-penalty statutes provide equal or
greater protections. New York provides the right to notice that the prosecution intends
to use evidence of any aggravating factor against a defendant and a unanimous jury-
finding concerning any aggravating circumstance, proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 400.27.7 (McKinney 1997). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3
(West 1995). The Supreme Court, however, has not constitutionalized these statutory
procedural guarantees. The Court continues to rely on Williams for the proposition that
the Due Process Clause is not 'a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentenc-
ing in the mold of trial procedure." Williams, 337 US. at 251. The Due Process Clause
does not offer the protections of a criminal trial for sentencing factors, even when death
is the consequence of the sentencing finding. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460
(1984) (holding that there is no constitutional requirement that a jury determine the ap-
propriateness of capital punishment).
15. Williams, 337 U.S. at 247.
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fact counted. After trial, judges can impose the maximum sen-
tence at their discretion without further ado. "We cannot say
that the due process clause renders a sentence void merely be-
cause a judge gets additional out-of-court information to assist
him in the exercise of this awesome power of imposing the death
sentence."
16
The engine driving the Williams Court's rationale was not
logic but experience. Judges need information if they are to ex-
ercise their sentencing discretion prudently. The Court feared
over-burdening judges with the requirements of full criminal
due process for sentencing factors. "We must recognize that most
of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in
the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if
information were restricted to that given in open court by wit-
nesses subject to cross-examination."17 Judges could not tailor
punishment to the individual criminal if the due process safe-
16. Williams, 337 US. at 252. In 1949, the Williams Court noted "modern concepts
individualizing punishment have made it all the more necessary that a sentencing judge
not be denied an opportunity to obtain pertinent information by a requirement of rigid
adherence to restrictive rules of evidence properly applicable to the trial" Id. at 247. The
Court cited reformation and rehabilitation of defendants as "important" sentencing goals.
"Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law." Id. at 248. Today,
Congress has largely repudiated these goals and once again embraced retribution. The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 lists the purposes of criminal punishment as just punish-
ment, adequate deterrence, and preservation of the public safety. 18 U.S.C § 3553(aX2)
(1994). See also US. SENTENCING GUIDELNES MANUAL, § A (1995). Rehabilitation is the
last consideration. In so far as Williams' holding depends upon the now discarded no-
tions of rehabilitation, Williams' denial of due process protections at sentencing is under-
mined. "Depriv[ing] sentencing judges of this kind of information" no longer "under-
mine[s] modern penological procedural policies that have been cautiously adopted
throughout the nation after careful consideration and experimentation." Williams 337
U.S. at 249-50. It is beyond the scope of this Article, however, to argue that full due pro-
cess protections should apply to discretionary sentencing proceedings.
17. Williams, 337 US. at 250. Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented. In his dis-
sent, Justice Murphy explained:
The record before us indicates that the judge exercised his discretion to deprive
a man of his life, in reliance on material made available to him in a probation
report, consisting almost entirely of evidence that would have been inadmissi-
ble at the trial. Some, such as allegations of prior crimes, was irrelevant. Much
was incompetent as hearsay. All was damaging, and none was subject to scru-
tiny by the defendant. Due process of law includes at least the idea that a per-
son accused of crime shall be accorded a fair hearing through all the stages of
the proceedings against him. I agree with the Court as to the value and hu-
maneness of liberal use of probation reports as developed by modern penolo-
gists, but, in a capital case, against the unanimous recommendation of a jury,
where the report would concededly not have been admissible at the trial, and
was not subject to examination by the defendant, I am forced to conclude that
the high commands of due process were not obeyed.
Williams, 337 U.S. at 253.
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guards of a criminal trial had to accompany each additional
finding made at sentencing. Williams, therefore, drew the due
process line at conviction. A defendant is entitled to full safe-
guards during trial. Once convicted, the defendant's due process
rights under discretionary sentencing are virtually extinct.18 So
long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the maximum au-
thorized by statute, judicial reliance on information introduced
at the sentencing hearing does not deprive defendants of their
due process rights under discretionary sentencing schemes. The
judge has the discretion to impose the maximum sentence upon
conviction after trial.
B. Specht v. Patterson: The Limits of the Williams Rationale
Eighteen years after its decision in Williams, the Supreme
Court addressed a due process challenge to a different kind of
sentencing scheme. In Specht v. Patterson,9 the defendant
claimed he was entitled to the due process rights of notice and a
full hearing at his sentencing.20 The defendant was convicted of
taking indecent liberties.21 The conviction carried a maximum
term of ten years. Colorado's Sexual Offender Act,22 however,
permitted a judge to sentence a person convicted of indecent lib-
erties to a term from one day to life as a sexual offender if thejudge found the defendant posed a threat of bodily harm or was
an habitual offender and mentally 1l1.23 These factors were not
elements of the crime of indecent liberties. 24 The Sexual Of-
fender Act permitted the judge to make the additional findings
without affording the defendant the opportunity to be heard.
The defendant had no right to confront or cross-examine wit-
18. In Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), the Supreme Court stated:
The Due Process Clause by its own: force forbids the State from convicting any
person of crime and depriving him of his liberty without complying fully with
the requirements of the Clause. But given a valid conviction, the criminal
defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that
the State may confine him...
I& at 224. Among the rights surviving conviction are the rights to substantial religious
freedom, to access to the courts, and to freedom from invidious discrimination based on
race, and a right not to be arbitrarily deprived of a state-created right. See Wolff v. Mc-
Donnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974).
19. 386 US. 605 (1967).
20. Id. at 607.
21. Id.
22. CoL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-19-1 to -10 (West 1994).
23. See Specht, 386 US. at 607.
24. See id. at 608.
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nesses or to present or compel evidence in his behalf.25 The
Tenth Circuit,26 relying on Williams, held the sentencing scheme
did not violate the Due Process Clause. The Circuit Court rea-
soned that the defendant received all his due process rights at
the time of trial. Upon conviction, he was subject to whatever
loss of liberty the legislature prescribed for his crime.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding the Colorado sentenc-
ing scheme violated the Due Process Clause. The Court reaf-
firmed that, in the discretionary sentencing context of Williams,
the Due Process Clause did not require a sentencing judge to
hold a hearing or permit a defendant to participate in it. "We
held in Williams v. New York... that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment did not require a judge to have
hearings and to give a convicted person an opportunity to par-
ticipate in those hearings when he came to determine the sen-
tence to be imposed."27 However, the Supreme Court refused to
extend Williams to the facts of Specht. Under the Colorado
scheme, Specht received a greater punishment than his convic-
tion for indecent liberties permitted. He was subject to the
greater penalty only because the sentencing judge made an ad-
ditional factual finding that the defendant was a sexual of-
fender. Because at the sexual offender hearing Specht received a
"magnified sentence,"2 based on a factual finding that was not
an element of the crime for which he was convicted (indecent
liberties), Specht faced a "radically different situation 2 9 than
the defendant in Williams.3" The Supreme Court held Specht
was entitled to a full judicial hearing before the judge could im-
pose the greater sentence:31
At such a hearing the requirements of due process cannot be satisfied by
partial or niggardly procedural protections. A defendant in such a pro-
ceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which
due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings. He must be af-
forded all those safeguards which are fundamental rights and essential
to a fair trial, including the right to confront and cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him.32
25. See id. at 610-11.
26. See Specht v. Patterson, 357 F2d 325, 326 (10th Cir. 1966).
27. Specht, 386 US. at 606.
28. Specht adopted as its own the language the Third Circuit used in United States
ex reL. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966), to strike down a compa-
rable sentencing scheme.
29. Specht, 386 US. at 608.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 609-10.
32. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Gerchinan, 355 F.2d at 312). At the time the
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Some appellate courts have opined that it was the bifur-
cated nature of the Colorado sentencing proceedings that made
Specht radically different from Williams.3 3 The Specht Court
noted the Colorado scheme made a conviction for indecent liber-
ties the basis for commencing another proceeding under the Sex-
ual Offenders Act.3 But, for Specht, dividing the hearings into
two was constitutionally significant only because the second
hearing required "a new finding of fact that was not an ingredi-
ent of the offense charged" in the first hearing. It would ele-
vate form over substance to conclude due process is satisfied if
the judge imposes the magnified sentence based on additional
fact-finding at one hearing rather than two. 6
C. McMillan v. Pennsylvania:37 Guiding the Discretion to
Punish
Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes restrict the sen-
tencing judge's traditionally broad discretion. The statutes typi-
cally describe certain aggravating circumstances concerning the
crime itself or the defendant's background. They require judges
to determine if the designated circumstances were present. If a
judge finds such aggravating facts exist, the judge is no longer
free to sentence anywhere within the maximum range, as under
a discretionary sentencing statute. Rather, the judge must im-
pose at least the minimum sentence prescribed in the statute.
The judge retains the discretion to impose a sentence greater
than, the minimum. The uppermost limit on the sentence re-
mains the maximum term the statute prescribes for the ele-
ments of the crime.
Supreme Court decided Specht, it had not yet applied to the States the due process
guarantee of trial by jury. It did so one year later. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US.
145, 149 (1968). Three years after Specht, the Court applied to the States the due pro-
cess safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Wimship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970).
33. See, eg., United States. v. Stewart, 531 F.2d 326, 332 (6th Cir. 1976).
34. See Specht, 386 US. at 608.
35. Id. See also Watson v. Borg, 1995 WL 630002, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Specht v.
Patterson held that a defendant at sentencing has the right of confrontation when sen-
tencing is dependent upon a new finding of fact that was not an element of the offense
for which the defendant was convicted.").
36. In Chandler v. Fretag, 348 US. 3, 10 (1954), the Supreme Court held the Due
Process Clause entitled the defendant to counsel before a judge could magnify the
defendants sentence from three years to life on the basis of additional fact-finding made
at a single hearing.
37. 477 US. 79 (1986).
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For example, assume a kidnapping statute imposes a maxi-
mum sentence of twenty years. It also lists the use of a weapon
as an aggravating factor. It mandates a minimum five-year sen-
tence if the aggravating factor is present. If, at the sentencing
hearing, the judge finds the convicted defendant used a gun to
commit the offense, the judge's traditional discretion is cabined.
The judge must, at a minimum, sentence the defendant to five
years.
Must a court afford a defendant the full due process protec-
tions of a criminal trial before a judge can impose a mandatory
minimum sentence? According to the United States Supreme
Court, no.38 McMillan v. Pennsylvania involved a due process
challenge to the validity of a state mandatory minimum statute.
The Pennsylvania statute 9 punished the commission of certain
enumerated felonies with at least five years in prison if the
defendant visibly possessed a firearm in the course of the desig-
nated felonies.40 Each of the felony convictions carried possible
maximum sentences in excess of five years regardless of aggra-
vating circumstances. The statute expressly stated that visible
possession was not an element of any of the offenses. 41 It au-
thorized the sentencing judge to find visible possession and per-
mitted the judge to base his or her finding on a preponderance
of the evidence.Y
A jury convicted each of the four defendants of one of the
felonies.4 Each sentencing judge refused to impose the required
statutory minimum, holding the statute unconstitutional." The
cases were consolidated on appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court unanimously concluded the statute did not violate the
Due Process Clause. It reasoned that the legislature did not in-
tend visible possession of a weapon to be an element of any of
the defendants' offenses. Moreover, the sentencing statute did
38. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 US. 79 (1986).
39. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, 42 PA. CoNS. STAT. § 9712 (1982). For the
text of the statute, see McMillan, 477 US. at 81-82 n.1.
40. The felonies designated were murder of the third degree, voluntary manslaugh-
ter, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, robbery, aggravated assault, kidnap-
ping, or attempts to commit the same. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. §9712(a) (1982).
41. See id. § 9712(b).
42. See id. A legislature may list aggravating factors in the penalty clause of a
criminal statute, or the legislature may create a separate sentencing statute containing
a list of factors which aggravate crimes defined in separate criminal statutes.
43. The defendants were variously convicted of aggravated assault (maximum sen-
tence of ten years), voluntary manslaughter (maximum sentence of ten years), and rob-
bery (maximum sentence of twenty years). See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82, 87.
44. Id.
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not increase the maximum sentence. The statute "merely re-
quire[d] a minimum sentence of five years, which may be more
or less than the minimum sentence that might otherwise have
been imposed."4 Arguing before the United States Supreme
Court, the defendants maintained the Pennsylvania statute de-
prived them of the due process right to proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt as well as a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial re-
garding visible possession of a weapon.
The Court in McMillan upheld the constitutionality of the
mandatory minimum act.46 It largely deferred to legislatures to
define the elements of a crime.47 Because the Pennsylvania leg-
islature chose not to include visible possession among the de-
fined elements, visible possession was only a sentencing factor.48
The due process requirements of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt traditionally attach only to the elements of a crime, not to
sentencing factors. "[T]he Due Process Clause requires the pros-
ecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements
included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is
charged... °"49
At the core of McMillan's rationale for denying full due pro-
cess in mandatory minimum sentencing is the Court's view that
a conviction authorizes a judge to impose the maximum sen-
tence. The McMillan Court affirmed the Williams doctrine de-
veloped in the context of discretionary sentencing. According to
McMillan, a defendant convicted under a mandatory minimum
statute is not entitled to any more due process at sentencing
than a defendant subject to traditional discretionary sentenc-
ing.50 The mandatory nature of the sentence does not change the
due process calculus. 51 A discretionary sentencing process per-
mits the judge to impose a particular sentence based on sentenc-
ing findings. A mandatory minimum statute simply requires it.
So long as the mandatory minimum punishment remains within
the maximum the court could impose in its discretion, the
defendant suffers no additional harm.
This assertion rests on McMillan's view that a conviction
strips a defendant of liberty up to the maximum sentence per-
45. Id. at 83.
46. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 91.
47. See id. at 85.
48. See id. at 85-86.
49. See id. at 85 (emphasis added) (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 US. 197,
210 (1977)).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 92.
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mitted for the elements of the crime.52 A defendant has already
received full due process with respect to the elements. Without
any surviving liberty interest to protect, there is no longer a
need for due process. So, for example, imposition of a mandatory
term of at least five years based on the use of a weapon would
not deprive a convicted kidnapper of any liberty interest. Con-
viction alone caused the defendant to lose a twenty-year liberty
interest.
However, McMillan explicitly cautioned: "there are constitu-
tional limits to the state's power [to define the elements of a
crime]. 53 McMillan's deference to the legislature, therefore, was
not absolute. The Court recognized that if a legislature crossed
constitutional limits, due process protections would apply to a
sentencing factor. "In certain limited circumstances," the Court
notes, "the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt applies to facts not formally identified as elements of
the offense charged."M
Although the Court declined to delineate all of the circum-
stances that might trigger Due Process protections for aggravat-
ing factors, it did set down certain express boundaries. The
Pennsylvania statute, the Court observed, remained within due
process boundaries because it did not create any impermissible
presumption of guilt or relieve the prosecution of its burden of
proving guilt, or change the definition of any existing crime. In
addition, as the Court repeatedly noted, a finding of visible pos-
session of a firearm did not subject a defendant to greater pun-
ishment than was available for the crime alone.55 It did not ex-
pose a defendant to a higher maximum than he or she might
otherwise receive. McMillan's situation, therefore, was not like
Specht's. 56 The Pennsylvania statute merely dictated the precise
weight to be accorded the aggravating factor within the range
permitted for the elements of the felonies.57
Section 9712 neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime commit-
ted nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it oper-
ates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty
within the range already available to it without the special finding of
visible possession of a firearm. [The act] "ups the anter for the defendant
52. See id. at 83-84, 88, 92.
53. See d., 477 U.S. at 86.
54. Id. The Supreme Court held in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), that due
process requires proof of every element of a crime. Id. at 364.
55. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82, 83, 87-88, 89.
56. Id. at 89.
57. Id at 89-90.
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only by raising to five years the minimum sentence which may be im-
posed within the statutory plan.5
D. Another Form of Guided Discretion: Sentencing Guidelines
The appellate courts have applied McMillan's due process
analysis to sentencing guideline schemes.59 Sentencing guideline
schemes specify factors which aggravate a crime. With respect to
these factors, the guidelines function much like mandatory mini-
mum statutes. A court must impose a sentence in a particular
range within the statutory maximum, depending upon the cir-
cumstances of the crime and the defendant's criminal history.
So, for example, if a defendant is convicted of kidnapping under
a statute carrying a twenty-year maximum, a sentencing guide-
line might require a judge to impose a sentence of at least five
years, if the judge finds that the defendant used a weapon to ac-
complish the kidnapping.60 Arguably, guidelines create a liberty
interest in a sentence below the maximum because a judge is no
longer free under the guidelines to impose the statutory maxi-
mum by virtue of the conviction alone, as under discretionary
sentencing.61 The circuit courts, however, have uniformly
adopted the view that guidelines do not create any liberty inter-
est in a sentence below the maximum.
The following language is typical:
The Guidelines have made the defendant's interest in a fair sentence
more defined and protectable. However, we emphasize that the convicted
defendant's liberty interest is not an interest in the maximum guideline
sentence set by the offense of conviction alone .... The Supreme Court
has recognized that due process protects a defendant's interest in fair
sentencing, but has emphasized in the same cases that the interest is
not defined as a liberty interest in a sentence below the statutory
maximum. 62
58. Id. at 87-88.
59. See id.; United States v. Vonstein, 105 F.3d 667 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Restrepo, 946 F2d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
60. U.S. SENTENcING GUimLNS MANUAL § 2A4.1(3) (1995) mandates a two level in-
crease if a dangerous weapon was used in a kidnapping.
61. For trenchant criticisms of federal sentencing under the guidelines, see
Deborah Young, Fact-finding at Federal Sentencing: Why the Guidelines Should Meet the
Rules, 79 CoRNELL L. Rnv. 299 (1994); David Yellin, Illusion Illogic, and Injustice: Real
Offense Sentencing and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REv. 403-(1993);
Susan N. Herman, The Tail That Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-finding Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L REv. 289
(1992).
62. Restrepo, 946 F2d at 659.
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The appellate courts can largely avoid the question of what
due process rights ought to be afforded the defendant at guide-
line sentencing, so long as they deny that a defendant retains a
liberty interest in a sentence below the statutory maximum.63
Because conviction alone has extinguished the defendant's lib-
erty interest in anything below the statutory maximum, nothing
is left for due process to protect.
II. THE PROBLEM: WHAT RATIONALE JUSTIFES DENYING FULL
CRIMINAL -DUE PROCESS UNDER MAXIMUM-ENHANCING STATUTES?
One genre of statutes differs markedly from mandatory
minimum statutes and sentencing guideline schemes. Maxi-
mum-enhancing statutes, as this Article uses the term, are stat-
utes which permit or require a sentencing court to impose a sen-
tence greater than that available, were the judge to consider
only the elements of the crime." For example, assume a kidnap-
ping statute defines the offense as restraining or taking another
by force or the threat of force. It allows imprisonment for no
more than twenty years if the defendant is convicted of the
crime. However, it permits, or requires, a sentence of thirty
years if the sentencing judge finds the defendant used a weapon
in committing the kidnapping. This is a maximum-enhancing
statute. The sentence is lengthened or "enhanced" over what it
would otherwise be, based on a fact or circumstance described in
the penalty clause of the statute.
63. In Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting), Justice
Souter, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, expressed the view that 'a defendant en-
joys an expectation subject to due process protection that he will receive a sentence
within the presumptively applicable range in the absence of grounds defined by the Act
as justifying departure." Id. at 147. But, as the Restrepo court points out, 'the presump-
tively applicable range is the range established after consideration of all the sentencing
factors set out in the Guidelines, not before' Restrepo, 946 F.2d at 658 n.8.
64. As examples of federal maximum-enhancing statutes, see 18 US.C. § 2113(d)
(1997) (increasing penalty if defendant assaulted victim or used dangerous weapon in
the commission of a bank robbery); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976) (increasing penalty if
defendant used a firearm in commission of a felony); 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1996) (increasing
penalty for car jacking if defendant caused serious bodily injury or death resulted); 21
US.C. § 844(a) (1990) (increasing penalty depending upon amount of illegal drug pos-
sessed); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1996) (increasing penalty for unlawful possession of firearm
if defendant was a three time felon); 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (1994) (increasing penalties for
resisting correctional officer if defendant used weapon or caused bodily injury). As exam-
ples of state maximum-enhancing statutes, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-221(1) (1978)
(increasing penalty for use of weapon during commission of felony); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 12022(aX) (West 1990) (increasing penalty for use of weapon during commission of
felony); MINN. STAT. § 609.1352(1)(1) (1989) (increasing penalty if offense motivated by
sexual impulse on part of predatory behavior).
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Maximum-enhancing statutes create a sentencing structure
very different from discretionary sentencing or sentencing under
mandatory minimum schemes or guidelines. Under a discretion-
ary sentencing structure, a kidnapping defendant may lose
twenty years of liberty, whether or not he or she used a weapon.
Under a mandatory minimum scheme, a defendant will forfeit
at least five years of liberty if the judge finds the defendant
used a weapon. A guideline may require a convicted kidnapper
to be sentenced more harshly within the maximum allowed for
kidnapping, if the defendant used a weapon. In these instances,
in the prevailing view of the circuit courts, all the safeguards of
a criminal trial precede any loss of liberty the defendant will
suffer by virtue of conviction. The statute set out the maximum
term for the crime and the sentence did not exceed the
maximum.
Can the same hold true for maximum-enhancing statutes?
Under a common-sense view of the matter, the judge adds an
extra term to what the crime alone permits. The judge thereby
deprives the defendant of more liberty than a bare conviction
would entail. What was twenty years for kidnapping becomes
thirty years for kidnapping with a gun. Of course, the motive for
imposing the "enhanced" sentence is apparent. Such a defendant
is worse than one who commits the kidnapping without the ag-
gravating factor. But, however sound the reason for imprison-
ment, the Due Process Clause guarantees that the state may
not imprison a person for a crime without first according the
defendant all the protections of a criminal trial.65 How can a
defendant constitutionally suffer the additional loss of liberty
without the due process protections of a criminal trial?
Does the Williams/McMillan approach to sentencing justify
the denial of full due process protections for maximum-
enhancing statutes? McMillan recognized that a statutory
scheme different from discretionary sentencing or mandatory-
65. "Every person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the Govern-
ment may not punish him unless and until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with the relevant constitutional guarantees."
Chapman v. United States, 500 US. 453, 465 (1991). "[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a
detainee may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due
process of law" Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). Penal statutes may not be ap-
plied 'without due process of law and without according [persons] the rights guaranteed
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, including notice, confrontation, compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses, trial by jury, and assistance of counsel Kennedy v. Rusk, 372
U.S. 144, 163 (1963). When a legislature wishes to punish a person, it "must provide for
a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused." Wong Wing v. United States, 163
US. 228, 236 (1896).
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minimum sentencing might cross the constitutional line and
trigger the safeguards of a criminal trial. Unlike the Penn-
sylvania statute before the Court in McMillan, maximum-
enhancing statutes expose a defendant to greater punishment
than the range "already available to [a court] without the spe-
cial finding of [an aggravating circumstance]." 66 Indeed, the
Court had already held one such statutory scheme violated Due
Process. The Court in McMillan distinguished Specht's maxi-
mum-enhancing scheme from the mandatory minimum statute
before it. It did not overrule or limit Specht. It left Specht's rea-
soning entirely intact. In upholding the constitutionality of the
Pennsylvania sentencing structure, the McMillan Court relied
on the fact that the sentencing factor in McMillan did not in-
crease the maximum punishment. Given this reasoning and Mc-
Millan's continuing adherence to Specht, is there any justifica-
tion for providing anything less than full criminal due process
for sentencing findings under maximum-enhancement statutes?
Courts have offered several justifications but none withstands
close scrutiny.
This Article will now examine the principal theories courts
use to conclude maximum-enhancement statutes do not trigger
the full due process protections of a criminal trial before a judge
sentences a defendant to a term longer than allowed for the ele-
ments of the crime alone. The Article will conclude that none of
the theories holds up to scrutiny.
A. It All Depends on What You Call It: "Element" or
"Sentencing Factor"--An Attempt to Justify Reduced Due
Process By Characterization
Legislatures have the power to specify certain conduct as an
element of a crime. But not everything a legislature includes in
a criminal statute is an element of the defined crime. Statutes
contain penalty provisions that are distinct from the elements.
The penalty provisions bear on the amount of punishment
meted out for the crime. A legislature may exclude specified con-
duct from the definition of the crime, making it part of the stat-
ute's penalty clause. When a penalty clause describes aggravat-
ing conduct, courts will refer to the conduct as a sentencing
factor or an enhancement, not an element of the crime.
A maximum-enhancing statute singles out particular con-
duct which serves to increase a defendant's punishment over
what it could be without consideration of that conduct. Defend-
66. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88.
[Vol. 46
1998] MAXIMUM SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS 191
ants sentenced under an enhancement statute may receive a
greater penalty than they otherwise could. But for the aggravat-
ing conduct, the sentence would be less. Understandably, some
defendants have argued they were denied due process safe-
guards when they were subjected to an increased sentence
based on conduct described in the criminal statute's penalty pro-
vision without the usual due process safeguards associated with
the state's right to deprive a defendant of liberty.
In responding to this challenge, some courts have asked
whether a legislature intended to make conduct an element of a
crime or part of the penalty clause.67 Conduct determined to be
"merely" a sentencing factor automatically justifies reduced due
process.0 They reason that Winship requires full trial due pro-
cess only for elements. A sentencing factor is not an element.
Therefore, full due process does not attach to such conduct even
though it increases the defendant's sentence.69 Characterizing
the conduct as a "sentencing factor" establishes the convicted
defendant's rights or, rather, lack thereof.
This reasoning is flawed. McMillan expressly noted that
facts not formally identified as elements of the offense charged
may trigger due process in some circumstances. 70 The Penn-
sylvania statute did not fall among those circumstances because
it did not authorize a sentence in excess of that otherwise al-
lowed for the offenses of conviction. Labeling enhancement con-
duct as a "sentencing factor" begs the real question: does the
factor trigger criminal due process protection? The judicial treat-
ment of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) of the Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act7' demonstrates the labeling approach fails to answer
67. See, eg., United States v. Sotelo-Rivera, 931 F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1991)
(holding that drug quantity is not element of offense of possession but is relevant only to
penalty provision); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 552 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that
Congress intended serious bodily injury or death to be penalty enhancing factor not ele-
ment of car jacking); United States v. McGatha, 891 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that Congress intended prior convictions to be sentencing enhancements for ille-
gal possession of firearm).
68. See McGatha, 891 F.2d at 1521; United States v. Segien, 114 F.3d 1014, 1018
(10th Cir. 1997).
69. See Segien, 114 F.3d at 1019 (citing cases).
70. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 856.
71. 21 US.C. § 844(a) (1996). The statute reads, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a con-
trolled substance .... Any person who violates this subsection may be sen-
tenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year... except that if he
commits such offense after a prior conviction [for a drug offense], he shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than 15 days but not more
than 2 years .... Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a person convicted
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this question.
In pertinent part, the Act authorizes a penalty of not more
than one-year in prison if a defendant knowingly and intention-
ally possessed a controlled substance. 72 But the Act authorizes
imprisonment for not less than five nor more than twenty years
if a defendant possessed more than five grams of cocaine base
(crack).73 Do the criminal due process safeguards of a criminal
trial precede a finding that the defendant possessed over five
grams of cocaine base? To answer this question, the circuit
courts have tried to discern what the legislature intended.74 Did
Congress want quantity to be an element of the crime or a sen-
tencing factor? A defendant's rights hinge on the proper
characterization.
With so much in the balance, courts examining § 844(a)
have expended a great deal of effort to determine whether Con-
gress intended quantity to be an element or a sentencing factor.
They have parsed the express wording and structure of the stat-
ute, its use of titles and paragraph headings, and the placement
of semi-colons. They have reviewed its legislative history. They
have teased out the defined elements of the crime from the stat-
ute's penalty provisions. Motivating these efforts is the premise
that legislative intention determines whether or not a defendant
will receive the due process protections of a criminal trial.
United States v. Butler75 is a good illustration of the method
at work. The defendant argued he was entitled to an express
jury-determination following appropriate instructions that he
was in possession of more than five grams of cocaine base.7 The
Ninth Circuit Court meticulously analyzed the statute. It deter-
mined that Congress stated all the elements of the § 844(a) de-
fined crime in the first sentence: "It shall be unlawful for any
person knowingly and intentionally to possess a controlled sub-
stance.. ."77 The second sentence, according to the court, refers
only to the penalty to be imposed: "Any person who violates this
under this subsection for the possession of a mixture or substance which con-




74. For cases interpreting § 844(a) as a sentencing factor, see United States v.
Monk, 15 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Smith, 34 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 1994). But
see, United States v. Puryear, 940 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1991) (element of crime); United
States v. Michael, 10 F.3d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same).
75. 74 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 1996).
76. Id. at 921.
77. I&
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subsection may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not
more than one year . . The third sentence, authorizing a
five- to twenty-year sentence if the mixture or substance "con-
tains cocaine base" in excess of five grams, was also part of the
Act's penalty clause. This sentence "reflect[s] Congress's intent
to direct the district courts to impose more severe penalties if
the controlled substance is cocaine base. 79 In Butler's view, pos-
session of cocaine base was not an element of the defined crime
because it was not included in the first sentence's definition.
Nor did possession of cocaine base comprise a separate crime
which would have triggered criminal due process safeguards. 80
Because "cocaine base" is a sentencing factor and not an ele-
ment of the defined offense, the defendant was not entitled to a
jury finding and proper instructions on the issue of cocaine
base.""
At no point does the court explain why full due process did
not apply to a factual finding that increased the punishment for
the elements alone. The court determined the legislative label
("sentencing factor") and then deferred to it. The court never ex-
plained why that label would obviate the defendant's due pro-
cess claim. Specht requires due process safeguards when a
defendant's punishment is magnified because of a sentencing
factor.8 2 McMillan indicated a statute should trigger due process
if a sentencing factor increases the maximum. Waving the magic
wand and incanting "sentencing factor," does not make the due
process question disappear.
Other circuits have faced similar challenges to § 844(a). In
fact; the Ninth Circuit in Butler relied upon the Second and
Seventh Circuits as persuasive authority for rejecting the
defendant's claim of denial of due process.A Yet neither of these
opinions explains why the legislature's intended label "sentenc-
ing factor" automatically reduces a defendant's due process pro-
tections when § 844(a) increases punishment beyond what the
elements alone permit. In United States v. Monk,8 the defend-
78. Id. at 922.
79. Id.
80. See id If Congress had intended to create a new crime of possession of cocaine
base, it would have inserted a requirement of mens rea, just as it did in the first
sentence.
81. Id. at 924.
82. See discussion supra Part LB
83. Butler, 74 E3d at 922-23.
84. 15 E3d 25 (2d Cim 1994). A jury convicted the defendant of possession of co-




ant claimed he was entitled to have a jury determination re-
garding the quantity of cocaine base he was charged with pos-
sessing. The Second Circuit held the first sentence of § 844(a)
defined the elements of the crime. The third sentence simply in-
dicated the punishment.8 As a result, the defendant was not en-
titled to a jury finding on the amount of cocaine base.86 The
court's analysis ended when it labeled quantity as "sentencing
factor." It never explained why the label justified the curtail-
ment of due process.
In also rejecting a due process challenge to § 844(a)'s sen-
tence enhancement for quantity, the Seventh Circuit indicated
some glimmer of recognition that labeling cannot end the due
process analysis. In United States v. Smith,87 a jury convicted
Smith of simple possession of cocaine base under § 844(a), but
made no determination of quantity.88 At sentencing, the district
court found Smith possessed more than five grams of cocaine
base and sentenced him to 82 months in prison.89 But for thisjudicial finding, the defendant could not have lost his liberty for
more than twelve months. The defendant claimed on appeal that
he was entitled to a jury-finding on the quantity of cocaine
base.9 The court analyzed § 844(a) in the same manner as the
Second Circuit:
[We cannot accept Mr. Smith's contention that the quantity of cocaine
base possessed is an essential element of possession of cocaine base in vi-
olation of [section] 844(a). Instead, we agree with United States v.
Monk . . . which held that quantity is not an element of simple posses-
sion of cocaine base under § 844(a).91
However, unlike the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit
went on with its analysis. It looked to McMillan to justify its
conclusion that a jury need not determine the sentencing factor:
In McMillan v. Pennsylvania... the Supreme Court recognized that in-
creasing the penalty for an offense through the use of a mandatory mini-
mum sentence whenever the sentencing judge found that the defendant
"visibly possessed a firearm" during the commission of the offense was
permissible. The defendant in that case was not confronted with a "radi-
cally different situation" from the usual sentencing proceeding .... Nor
85. Id& at 27.
86. Id&
87. 34 F.3d 514 (7th Cir 1994).
88. Id. at 517.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 518.
91. Id. at 517.
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was the defendant faced with a situation in which the government was
attempting to avoid the mandate of In Re Winship .... Similarly, in this
case Congress "simply took one factor that has always been considered
by sentencing courts to bear on punishment... and dictated the precise
weight to be given that factor. 92
The Seventh Circuit's reliance on McMillan is misplaced. It
adopted the term "sentencing factor" from McMillan, but ne-
glected the context in which it was used. In fact, McMillan's
logic does not apply to the facts before the Seventh Circuit in
Smith. Both McMillan and Smith involved the same ultimate
question: did the defendant lose liberty because of a judicial
finding a jury should have made? In McMillan, the Court held
the Sixth Amendment did not require a jury to find the defend-
ants visibly possessed a firearm. Visible possession was a sen-
tencing factor and, more importantly, the defendants did not
suffer any greater loss of liberty than what they might have suf-
fered for the elements alone. The McMillan Court recognized
that labeling conduct a "sentencing factor" does not fully answer
a petitioner's due process claim. McMillan simply explained why
visible possession, as a sentencing factor, was not entitled to the
criminal trial protections of a jury-finding or proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt under the Pennsylvania statute. The petitioners'
loss of liberty was within the range allowed for the defined
crime without regard to any aggravating conduct. Therefore, Mc-
Millan attributed the defendant's loss of liberty to the crime
alone.
In its analysis of § 844(a), the Seventh Circuit in Smith
adopted the methodology of McMillan and searched for legisla-
tive intent. The court concluded that the legislature intended
the quantity of cocaine to be a sentencing factor. The court then
tried to explain why a judge and not the jury could make the
quantity finding. But its analogy of "quantity" to McMillan's
"visible possession" breaks down. McMillan's visible possession
did not result in a loss of liberty beyond what was authorized
for the crime.alone. "Quantity" under § 844(a) does. It increases
the range available to the judge from one year (a misdemeanor)
to five- to twenty-years. The Smith court ignored this crucial dif-
ference between § 844(a) and the Pennsylvania statute involved
in McMillan. It was satisfied with attaching the same label, but,
as noted, a label does not explain what justifies increased pun-
ishment without the due process protections that precede crimi-
92. Id. at 520.
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nal punishment. The Smith court mentions Specht only once.93
It correctly notes that McMillan's facts were not like Specht's.
But it fails to take into account that Smith's facts are not like
McMillan's. In Smith, the judicial fact-finding exposed the
defendant to radically different sentencing consequences. In fact,
Smith is like Specht and should trigger the due process safe-
guards of a criminal trial.
A Sixth Circuit panel exposed the inadequacy of labeling in
United States v. Rigsby. 4 A jury convicted the defendant of un-
lawfully manufacturing marijuana.9 5 The jury did not determine
whether the defendant manufactured eighty-nine thousand
plants, as the prosecution claimed, or whether, as the evidence
would have allowed, the defendant manufactured only one
plant. At sentencing, the court found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant manufactured over one thousand
plants. This additional finding increased the defendant's possible
punishment from five years to a range of ten years to life.96
On appeal, the defendant argued the district court erred
when it failed to advise the jury concerning the significance of
the amount of marijuana. The court had instructed the jury that
"[als far as you are concerned, the number of one thousand ma-
rijuana plants in count one is of no significance."97 The Rigsby
panel acknowledged "the great weight of authority holding that
quantity is not an element of a section 841 offense."98 The panel,
nonetheless, disagreed with that authority, including its own
circuit's controlling precedent.9 9 Rigsby noted that other circuits
reached their conclusion that quantity was not an element of
the offense on the basis that quantity is listed under the penalty
clause of § 841.100 In company with these circuits, Rigsby was
willing to assume that Congress intended to make quantity a
consideration only for sentencing.101 Nonetheless, Rigsby recog-
nized "we are not required to hold that quantity may be consid-
ered for sentencing by the district judge under the preponder-
93. Id.
94. 943 F2d 631 (9th Cir. 1991).
95. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(aX1), 841(b)(1)(A). Defendant was also charged with carrying a
firearm during a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and illegal pos-
session of a shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). Rigsby, 943 E2d at 634.
96. The court sentenced Rigsby to 151 months on the drug counts.
97. Rigsby, 943 F.2d at 641.
98. Id. at 640.
99. Id,
100. Id. at 641.
101. The panel indicated that it doubted the validity of the assumption. See id. at
641 n.6.
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ance of evidence standard merely because it is listed under the
penalty provision."1 2 Rigsby correctly grasped that McMillan re-
tained limits on legislatures. "Legislative bodies do not have the
unfettered discretion to lessen the government's burden of proof
of a criminal charge simply by characterizing a factor as a pen-
alty consideration rather than as an element of the offense."10
On Rigsby's view, allowing a judge to determine quantity under-
mines the fundamental principle of justice that a defendant has
a right to a jury trial respecting critical facts about the alleged
crime.1' Rigsby understands that the function of a factor, not its
label, is critical. The finding of quantity exposed the defendant
to "a substantially greater penalty of at least ten years up to life
imprisonment compared to a maximum of five years"105 if the
defendant manufactured less than 50 kilograms. Allowing a
judge to find quantity and impose the greater sentence violates
a defendant's right to a trial by jury. Although the Rigsby panel
stood by its reasoning, it was constrained by its own circuit's
precedent,10 6 to affim the defendant's sentence. 107 At present,
the panels voice is a poignant cry in the wilderness.
B. Make the Enhancement Disappear
By labeling particular conduct as a sentencing factor, a
court is implicitly holding that a statute has not created a sepa-
rate crime. A court may accurately interpret legislative intent
when it finds a legislature intended conduct as a sentencing fac-
tor and not a separate crime. It may also be that a "sentencing
factor" should wear that label if that is what the legislature in-
tended. But, whatever its label, a maximum sentence enhancer
appears to punish the conduct that caused the enhancement.
McMillan does not offer any justification for reduced due pro-
cess in such a case. On the contrary, McMillan upheld Penn-
sylvania's minimum sentence increase because it did not "al-
ter[ ] the maximum for the crime.' 08 If the legislative label of
"sentencing factor" does not justify elimination of due process
safeguards for maximum sentence enhancers, is there anything
else that does?
102. Id. at 641.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 643.
105. See id
106. See United States v. Hodges, 935 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1991).
107. See Rigsby, 943 F.2d at 643.
108. MWI v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
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The First Circuit sought to make McMillan's "beyond the
maximum" principle compatible with reduced due process for
maximum sentence enhancers. In United States v. Rivera-
Gomez,"°9 the First Circuit Court did not merely label the con-
duct as a sentencing factor. It made the enhanced portion of the
defendant's sentence disappear.
In Rivera-Gomez, the trial court sentenced the defendant to
life in prison for a car jacking in which death occurred. 18
U.S.C. § 2119 provided in relevant part:
whoever, possessing a fire arm... takes a motor vehicle that has been
transported or shipped in interstate commerce from a person.., by force
and violence or by intimidation... shall-
(1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or
both,
(2) ff serious bodily injury... results, be fined under this title or im-
prisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
(3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any
number of years up to life, or both.110
A jury convicted Rivera-Gomez of caijacking. At sentencing, the
judge found that death had resulted in the course of the caijack-
ing. The defendant attacked the constitutionality of his sen-
tence. He conceded that "death results" is not an element of
carjacking. He claimed that the life sentence punished him for
conduct for which he was not charged."'
The First Circuit examined the wording and structure of the
caijacking statute. In its view, the first section defines the base
offense and the following two sections "clear the way for en-
hanced sentences if either serious bodily injury or death results
from the commission of the carijacking offense." According to the
First Circuit, Congress did not intend the "death results" provi-
sion of the act to be an element of the offense, nor did it intend
to create a new species of caijacking offense (caijacking when
death results). It intended "simply to augment the sentences for
certain aggravated carjackings .... -1
109. 67 F.3d 993 (1st Cir. 1995).
110. Congress has amended the Act to require a specific intent to cause death or
serious bodily harm. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
§ 60003(a)(14), Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
111. See Rivera-Gomez, 67 E3d at 1000.
112. See id at 1000-01.
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The court then explained why due process does not require
indictment and proof of a fact that "simply" augments a
sentence:
Having concluded that 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3) is a sentence-enhancing fac-
tor, we next consider the constitutionality... of appellants life sentence
on count 3 [in which death resulted]. Viewed as a sentence-enhancing
factor, subsection (3) represents a congressional judgment that the pun-
ishment for committing the crime of caijacking should be harsher if the
offense, as actually perpetrated, includes conduct that produces the de-
mise of a victim. In this sense, the architecture of the carjacking statute
bears a family resemblance to the design of the federal sentencing guide-
lines, which make generous use of "sentencing enhancement regimes
evincing the judgment that a particular offense should receive a more se-
rious sentence within the authorized range if it was either accompanied
by or preceded by additional criminal activity." For example, under
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, "this court has repeatedly upheld the inclusion as rele-
vant conduct of acts either not charged or charged but dropped," and au-
thorized resort to that conduct as a sentence-enhancing datum. By like
token, a defendant convicted of drug trafficking will find his sentence en-
hanced if it turns out that he possessed a dangerous weapon during the
commission of the crime ....
The court analogized an enhancement sentence to a guide-
lines sentence. Guidelines sentences, the court reasoned, in-
crease punishment on the basis of aggravating factors. A finding
of aggravating circumstances under the guidelines does not re-
quire the full safeguards of criminal due process. Therefore, the
court concluded, the safeguards are not required under the
caijacking act either, when it increases punishment on the basis
of aggravating circumstances.
This analogy is flawed. Yes, fact-finding under the guide-
lines does not require full criminal due process. But that is be-
cause any increase the guidelines permit must remain within
the statutory maximum. The guideline sentence is valid, as long
as the statutory maximum is valid. But it does not follow that
the statutory maximum is valid because the guideline is valid.
For example, suppose a statute subjects kidnapping to a
penalty of twenty years. A guideline then requires a sentence of
at least ten years if the defendant used a weapon to accomplish
the kidnapping. Under McMillan, the guideline sentence of ten
years is valid without full due process safeguards for the
weapon finding because the ten years for the weapon remains
within the twenty-year statutory maximum for the kidnapping.
113. 1& at 1000-01 (case citations and statute citations omitted).
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If, however, the statute called for twenty years for kidnapping,
but thirty years for kidnapping accomplished with a weapon, a
guideline range up to thirty years would be valid only if the in-
creased statutory maximum itself was valid. The enhanced pen-
alty upheld in Rivera-Gomez was not within the maximum
guideline range for simple carjacking. The guideline range does
not validate the extra ten years.
Rivera-Gomez's analogy does not explain why the statutory
increase, of ten years in this case, over the sentence available
for the elements can be imposed without full due process safe-
guards. Indeed, the First Circuit Court went so far as to deny
flatly that "death results" even altered the maximum for the
elements:
Appellant is not being punished for the uncharged crime of murder, but,
rather, he is being punished more severely for the crime of carjacking be-
cause his conduct during the commission of the crime led to the loss of a
victim's life. Of course, the burgeoning use of sentence enhancers by Con-
gress and the Sentencing Commission as part of the catechism of punish-
ment poses an obvious danger that, in extreme circumstances, the la-
gniappe might begin to overwhelm the main course. In all probability,
there are constitutional limits on the way sentencing factors can be
deployed in the punishment of a substantive offense. But that proposi-
tion is only of academic interest where, as here, the sentence enhance-
ment scheme "neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime commit-
ted nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty."1 '
How can the court attribute this sentence to the elements
alone when the elements do not permit more than a fifteen-year
term? Life in jail is more than fifteen years in jail. Ask any
defendant. A life sentence for "death results" alters the maxi-
mum penalty for the elements of caijacking.
On the basis of McMillan, Rivera-Gomez admits "[i]n all
probability, there are constitutional limits on the way sentenc-
ing factors can be deployed in the punishment of a substantive
offense"" 5 But faced with one of those limits, an increase in the
maximum, the Rivera-Gomez court blinked it away. It denied
that the sentencing factor altered the statutory maximum. Ap-
parently, the factor did not increase the maximum, but estab-
lished a new maximum, still based on the same elements. If this
view is correct, no sentence alters the maximum available for
the elements alone. This approach formalistically respects Mc-
Millan's logic but simultaneously guts it of all possible force.
114. Id. at 1001.
115. 1&
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C. The 'Subset" Theory of Enhancements
It is possible to effect the same disappearance using differ-
ent language. Some courts speak of the enhancers as delimiting
a "subset" or "portion" of defendants whose aggravating conduct
has made them eligible for an "increased" sentence. 116 This "in-
crease," however, is not considered an increase over the base of-
fense for the elements. Rather, it expands the base. The "in-
crease," therefore, is for the elements alone. This difference in
base is justified on the ground that one defendant may commit
the elements of a crime in a more aggravating fashion, or with a
worse character, than another. The "subset" approach, like that
in Rivera-Gomez, acknowledges that an enhanced sentence is
greater than a lesser term (e.g., life is greater than fifteen
years). But both assume the harsher sentence represents pun-
ishment for the elements only.
In United States v. Haggerty,117 the defendant challenged his
sixty-six month term of imprisonment imposed under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326. Paragraph (a) of the statute authorized a two-year term
of imprisonment for any deported alien who re-enters the
United States. Paragraph (b), under which Haggerty was sen-
tenced, authorized a twenty-year term, for any re-entering alien
"whose deportation was subsequent to a conviction for commis-
sion of an aggravated felony." Haggerty's indictment did not al-
lege a prior aggravated felony. He claimed the indictment was
invalid for failure to charge an element of the offense for which
he was punished.
The Eighth Circuit had to decide whether the prior convic-
tion was an element of Haggerty's offense or a condition trigger-
ing enhancement. The court analyzed the statutory language. It
determined that subsection (a) defined the crime of illegal re-
entry,"8 and "subsection (b) does no more than single out sub-
sets of those persons reentering the country illegally for more
severe punishment" 9 Because the prior felony was a sentence
enhancer and not a separate offense, the court held the indict-
ment did not have to charge the prior aggravated felony. 0
The Haggerty court did not elaborate on its subset theory.
116. See, eg., United States v. Haggerty, 85 F.3d 403 (8th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Ryan, 9 .3d 660, 667 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995); United States
v. Rush, 840 E2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United States v. West, 826 F.2d 909
(9th Cir. 1987).
117. 85 E3d 403 (8th Cir. 1996).
118. See id. at 405.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 405-06.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Indeed, it borrowed the language from other opinions, 2 1 which
also did not explain it. Nonetheless, the theory is alluring.
Under the subset theory, the penalty clause of an enhancement
statute divides the set of all those convicted of the crime into
groups deserving differing punishments. The legislature has not
created one maximum sentence and then particular appropriate
sentences along this range. Rather, the legislature has created
different maximum sentences depending on aggravating factors.
Assume, for example, a legislature imposes a maximum of
twenty years for kidnapping accomplished without a gun and a
maximum of thirty years if the kidnapping is accomplished with
a gun. Under the "subset" theory, the legislature has not in-
creased the penalty for kidnapping when it is accomplished with
a gun. It has simply declared that kidnapping is punishable by
thirty years for the subset of persons who accomplish it by use
of a gun. This legislative sentencing structure, it may be argued,
is analogous to discretionary sentencing. Traditionally, judges
made similar divisions based on their discretion. They divided
defendants into those more and less worthy of punishment, de-
pending on the defendant's character and the way in which the
offense was committed. Full due process was not required for
traditional sentencing procedures. The conviction alone substan-
tially diminished the defendant's liberty interest (or due process
rights) to the extent of the maximum period of confinement.m
Why invoke full due process merely because a statute now
guides the dividing process that previously lay within the
judge's discretion? Indeed, reply the subset theorists, full due
process is not triggered.
This approach leaves something in the shade. Under tradi-
tional sentencing, a defendant lost his due process right to lib-
erty to the extent of the maximum sentence under the statute.
Thus, a defendant convicted of an offense carrying a maximum
of twenty years lost his due process right to twenty years of lib-
erty. The source of that loss included any considerations thejudge might entertain about the defendant's character or
method of committing the crime. The entire twenty years was
initially protected by due process but forfeited upon conviction
after a criminal trial. The defendant's liberty beyond the statu-
tory maximum was not threatened. His due process right to that
121. See Ryan, 9 E3d at 667-69 (finding 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) to be enhancement pro-
vision); Rush, 840 E2d at 577 (finding Armed Career Criminal Act amendment to pos-
session of firearm statute to be enhancement provision).
122. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477
US. 79, 92 n.8 (1986).
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liberty was not lost. But, a maximum-enhancing statute allows
a defendant convicted of a crime whose elements carry a twenty-
year maximum (protected by full due process) to lose his liberty
for thirty years because he falls into a "subset." Why are the
defendant's last ten years less protected than the first twenty?
Although the subset theory may not raise due process problems
under traditional sentencing, it fails to explain or justify a
defendant's loss of liberty under an enhancement statute. In ef-
fect, the theory is nothing more than a naked assertion that a
state may take a defendant's liberty for aggravating conduct
without full trial due process. Of course, it is possible to assert
the entire thirty years are attributable to the elements alone to
which full due process attached, but this is no more than Ri-
vera-Gomez's denial that a sentencing enhancer alters a
maximum.
D. Deny that McMillan Requires Full Trial Due Process for
Maximum-Enhancements
A court could candidly approach the due process problem
posed by a maximum-sentence enhancer. Rather than escaping
the due process puzzle by ignoring the increase above the maxi-
mum, a court could deny that the increase makes any difference
for due process purposes. But such an approach would conflict
directly with McMillan's logic. Nonetheless, several courts have
ventured down this road.
In United States v. Lowe,123 the defendant claimed he was
entitled to a jury-finding before he could be exposed to a maxi-
mum-enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal
Act. 124 Rejecting the defendant's claim, the Seventh Circuit as-
serted that McMillan did not intend its "greater or additional
punishment" analysis to be the sole test of whether full trial due
process attaches to aggravating circumstances.2 5 Admittedly,
McMillan indicated a variety of ways a sentencing scheme
might transgress due process boundaries. It might violate the
presumption of innocence, unconstitutionally lighten the govern-
ment's burden of proof, or disproportionately punish a sentenc-
ing factor.2 6 But nothing in McMillan suggests a statute would
123. 860 E2d 1370 (7th Cir. 1988).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 924.
125. See Lowe, 860 F.2d at 1379. The Tenth Circuit similarly dilutes the signifi-
cance of McMillan's language. See United States v. Segien, 114 F.3d 1014, 1019 (1997)
(stating increase over maximum is only one concern of McMillan).
126. See McMillan, 477 U.S. at 87-88.
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have to cross every one of these boundaries before it violates
due process. In the Lowe court's view, because the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act did not violate due process in every way possi-
ble, it did not violate it at all.
After Lowe, the Ninth Circuit made its attempt to relegate
McMillan's "additional punishment" language to the dust-bin. In
Nichols v. McCormick,1 27 the defendant was convicted of kidnap-
ping and assault. After the sentencing judge found the defend-
ant used a weapon, the judge imposed an additional ten-year
term under a state weapons enhancement statute. The court
could not have imposed such a lengthy sentence without its sep-
arate fact-finding concerning the weapon.
On appeal, the defendant claimed his enhanced sentence vi-
olated his right to due process and his right to a jury-finding.m
The Nichols court candidly acknowledged that "the Montana
statute, unlike that of Pennsylvania in McMillan, allows the
sentencing court to impose a penalty in excess of that permitted
by the underlying offense."29 But the court in Nichols consid-
ered the defendant's reading of McMillan too narrow.30 The
Ninth Circuit, like the Seventh in Lowe, took the view that Mc-
Millan's "beyond the maximum" limit was just one of several
factors reviewing courts should consider in judging the due pro-
cess validity of maximum-enhancing statutes. McMillan, Nichols
noted, also cautioned against statutes which redefine elements
of an offense as sentencing factors, and against statutes which
relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving all the defined
elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Nichols concluded that be-
cause the legislature did not commit the last two sins, it did not
matter that it committed the first. This reasoning takes McMil-
lan's logic off its foundations. Under McMillan, a conviction ac-
companied by the full protections of a criminal trial strips a
defendant of his or her liberty interest up to the maximum per-
mitted for the offense. McMillan offers no justification for de-
priving a defendant of liberty beyond the maximum without full
due process protections. Nichols acknowledged that this is pre-
cisely what happened to the defendant before it. Rather than
grant the due process protections which McMillan requires, the
Nichols court decided not to take McMillan seriously.
Blithe dismissal of McMillan is no longer possible. A recent
Supreme Court decision dispels any doubt about the importance
127. 929 F2d 507 (9th Ci. 1991).
128. See id. at 509.
129. I& at 510.
130. Id
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of the line McMillan drew around "greater or additional" pun-
ishment and suggests that lower court attempts to blur the line
are erroneous. In Witte v. United States,131 the Court explained
precisely why it upheld the statute at issue in McMillan:
Significantly, we emphasized that the statute at issue "neither alters the
maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense
calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing
court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already availa-
ble to it without the special finding of visible possession of a fire-
arm ... . That is, the statute "simply took one factor that has always
been considered by sentencing courts to bear on punishment... and dic-
tated the precise weight to be given that factor .... For this reason, we
approved a lesser standard of proof provided for in the statute.... 7M
A sentence enhancer that increases punishment beyond the stat-
utory maximum goes beyond the boundary established by Mc-
Millan. It threatens the defendant's liberty interest and requires
the due process safeguards of a criminal trial.
E. A Special Category: Maximum Sentence Enhancements
Based on Prior Convictions
Recidivist statutes typically authorize, or mandate, greater
maximum sentences if a defendant is convicted of a new crime
and has been convicted of a specified number or kind of prior
criminal offenses. When prior convictions increase the maximum
punishment beyond what it could be absent the prior convic-
tions, judicial reliance on the prior convictions to increase the
defendant's punishment may raise limited due process issues.
For instance, the prosecution's duty to give a defendant notice of
its intent to rely on the convictions and the timeliness of the no-
tice. But beyond these limited questions, the use of prior convic-
tions to enhance punishment does not pose the critical due pro-
cess issues that enhancements not based on prior convictions do.
Whether a legislature intends a prior conviction to be an ele-
ment of an offense or simply a sentence enhancer, the defendant
has already received full trial due process for the prior convic-
tion. For this reason, federal appellate courts have rejected
131. 515 U.S. 389 (1995). The defendant was convicted of distributing cocaine. Com-
plying with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the trial judge sentenced him for the co-
caine offense and increased his sentence in light of uncharged drug offenses. A grand
jury later indicted the defendant for the same conduct that contributed to his cocaine
sentence. The United States Supreme Court held this did not violate Double Jeopardy.
Id& at 403. See infra text accompanying notes 145-52.
132. 515 U.S. at 401.
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claims that maximum sentence enhancements based on prior
convictions violate due process.'m
Buckley v. Butler'34 illustrates this analysis. The defendant,
after conviction of armed robbery, was sentenced under a Louisi-
ana multiple-offender statute.m The Fifth Circuit explained why
the defendant could receive a higher maximum sentence as a re-
peat felon without the due process rights that attach to a crimi-
nal trial:
[Recidivist statutes] do not relate to determining what the accused has
done, but rather to what the state has previously determined that the
accused has done. And that previous determination must have been a
formal, judicial determination of guilt; and hence one as to which the full
measure of constitutional protections was available. The scheme of the
statutes, therefore, cannot properly be understood as intended or calcu-
lated to infringe on the rights attending determination of whether the
accused has engaged in criminal conduct.us
The Fifth Circuit did not rest content after labeling the
predicate convictions as a sentencing factor. The court went on
to explain why full due process need not attach to the maxi-
mum-enhancer at issue. The determination of the defendant's
enhancing conduct had previously occurred with full due
process.
The circuit courts have adopted Buckley's reasoning and ap-
plied it to maximum sentence enhancements imposed under the
federal Armed Career Criminal Act.137 That Act penalizes any
person convicted of a felony who received, possessed, or trans-
ported any firearm in interstate commerce.1 38 The Act sets a
maximum punishment of five years for the offense. 139 But in the
case of a person with three previous convictions for robbery, or
burglary, or both, the statute mandates imprisonment for at
least fifteen years.140 Reviewing courts now consistently hold
that Congress intended the predicate convictions to be sentence
enhancements only.41 Because the prior convictions are en-
133. The Supreme Court has upheld repeat-offender statutes against due process
and double jeopardy challenges. See Moore v. Missouri, 159 US. 673, 677 (1895); Oyler v.
Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451 (1962); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
134. 825 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1987).
135. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 529.1]) (West 1997).
136. Buckley, 825 F.2d at 903.
137. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (West 1997).
138. Id. § 922(g).
139. Id. § 924(aXl).
140. Id- § 924(eXl).
141. See United States v. McGatha, 891 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1990) (listing
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hancements rather than elements of a new crime, the circuit
courts have rejected defendants' due process claims. The indict-
ment need not charge the prior convictions.14 The state need
not prove the convictions to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.14
The defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction concerning
the prior convictions.1" The reviewing courts offer more than
mere labeling to justify their rejection of these rights. They em-
phasize that the defendant's enhancing conduct has already re-
ceived all the safeguards of a criminal trial. This approach indi-
rectly supports the conclusion that due process rights should
attach to maximum-sentence enhancement schemes.
In United States v. McGatha,14 the Eleventh Circuit labeled
as a sentencing factor the three prior convictions portion of the
Armed Career Criminal Act.'4 The court then explained why it
was unnecessary to submit the sentencing factor to the jury:
The mandatory sentencing provisions of § 924(e), applicable only after
the defendant has been convicted of one of the predicate offenses de-
scribed in § 922(g), closely resemble a recidivist provision. As with the
typical recidivist provision, the sentencing factors are not submitted for
jury consideration since no additional fact finding is necessary-the
defendant has received the totality of constitutional protections due in
the prior proceeding on the predicate offense.1 47
That the prior convictions received "the totality of constitutional
protections" distinguishes the use of such prior convictions at
sentencing from other conduct described by maximum sentence
enhancers. Requiring full trial due process for the prior convic-
tions would be redundant.
Recidivist sentencing is a type of sentence enhancement.
However, the due process reasoning that supports such recidi-
vist sentencing does not apply beyond its narrow context.148 On
the contrary, it underscores the need for full due process protec-
tions when the enhancement is based on conduct not proven
with full due process protection.
cases holding Armed Career Criminal Act is a sentence enhancement statute).
142. See United States v. Rumney, 867 E2d 714 (lst Cir. 1989).
143. See United States v. Blannon, 836 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1988).
144. See United States v. Hawkins, 811 E2d 210 (3d Cia 1987).
145. 891 F.2d 1520 (11th Cir. 1990).
146. Id. at 1525.
147. Id. at 1526.
148. Like the Seventh Circuit in Lowe, the McGatha court rejected McMillan's
"greater or additional punishment" language as the sole test for measuring whether a
sentencing factor becomes an element of an offense. This view is no more valid in Mc-
Gatha than in Lowe See supra text accompanying note 125.
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F. The Double Jeopardy Analogy
Witte acknowledges the significance of McMillan's "greater
punishment" analysis. The Pennsylvania statute in McMillan
was valid because the defendants' punishment did not exceed
the maximum attributable to the elements of the crimes alone.
Doesn't a statute, then, trigger the full safeguards of a criminal
trial if a sentencing factor results in punishment greater than
the elements permit? The conclusion would seem inescapable
unless the enhanced portion of the sentence is attributable to
the elements alone. If a statute punishes kidnapping by twenty
years in prison but its penalty clause raises the maximum to
thirty years for use of a weapon, is the extra ten years somehow
attributable solely to the elements? If so, no enhancement exists
beyond the base term of twenty years allowed for the elements.
The "extra" ten years is absorbed into the base term and be-
comes the same as McMillan's enhancement within the maxi-
mum. And, as in McMillan, the added ten years would not trig-
ger full criminal due process because the defendant's liberty
interest is attributed solely to the elements.
Witte points to two instances in which "punishment" due to
aggravating factors is not punishment for the factors but pun-
ishment for the elements alone. Neither instance explains the
absence of full trial due process for maximum-enhancers.
1. Double Punishment Challenges under the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. The defendant in Witte was convicted of distribu-
tion of cocaine. Witte had also distributed drugs on three previ-
ous related occasions, although he was never indicted for those
offenses. Nonetheless, at sentencing, the court took into account
Witte's earlier conduct and tripled his sentence, as the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines direct. A grand jury later indicted Witte
for the same three drug offenses that had increased his sen-
tence. Witte claimed he was in jeopardy of being punished twice
for the earlier conduct. The Court rejected his claim. "Where the
legislature has authorized ... a particular punishment range
for a given crime, the resulting sentence within that range con-
stitutes punishment only for the offense of conviction for pur-
poses of double jeopardy inquiry." 149 In effect, the sentencing
judge did not punish Witte for the earlier conduct when it trip-
led Witte's sentence. He was punished only for his conviction.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court applied the reasoning
it used to validate repeat-offender statutes challenged on double
149. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 403 (1995).
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punishment grounds. Recidivist statutes, the Court in Witte ex-
plained, increase the penalty for the latest crime only. No por-
tion of the increased punishment is attributable to the earlier
crimes. The enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense
"is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional pen-
alty for the earlier crimes," but instead as "a stiffened penalty
for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated of-
fense because a repetitive one"15
A recidivist defendant, therefore, is not punished twice for
the same conduct. By parity of reasoning, Witte was not in jeop-
ardy of being punished twice for his earlier drug-related con-
duct. He was never punished once for it. For double jeopardy
purposes, all of his sentence, just like all of a recidivist's sen-
tence, is attributable solely to his conviction. The defendant is
"punished only for the fact that the present offense was carried
out in a manner that warrants increased punishment."'51
If, for double jeopardy purposes, a recidivist defendant's en-
hanced punishment is attributable solely to the elements of his
latest crime, should an enhanced sentence be attributed solely
to the elements for due process purposes? If a maximum-
enhanced sentence is not "punishment" for the enhancing fac-
tors, then a defendant has no liberty interest at stake when a
judge considers the factors. Without a liberty interest, there
would be nothing for the Due Process Clause to protect. If a
maxmnum-enhanced sentence is attributable solely to the convic-
tion for purposes of due process as well as double jeopardy, then
the due process puzzle is solved.
The Court in Witte, however, was careful to restrict its pun-
ishment allocation to an analysis of the appellant's Double Jeop-
ardy claims. 2 The Court understood that what is reasonable for
one purpose may be indefensible for another. Different questions
require different answers. A double-punishment claim looks to
whether a defendant was or might be punished. When a defend-
ant has committed previous crimes and stands for sentencing on
a new offense, a judge has sound reason to increase the punish-
ment for the latest conviction. Earlier punishment did not deter
150. Id. at 410.
151. Id at 401-03.
152. In a concurring opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas reject Witte's double jeop-
ardy logic: "We do not punish you twice for the same offense," says the Government, "but
we punish you twice as much for one offense solely because you also committed another
offense, for which other offense we will also punish you (only once) later on." I& at 407.




the defendant. In punishing a repeat-offender more harshly for
the most recent offense, a judge is not punishing the earlier of-
fenses again. Recidivist cases, therefore, allocate all of a defend-
ant's sentence to the latest offense for double punishment
purposes.
The Court treated a recidivist's sentence differently, how-
ever, when a defendant challenges a sentence on due process
grounds. Here the question is not whether a judge has already
punished a defendant. The issue is how much process was due
before the judge could impose the penalty. When the potential
penalty exceeds the maximum available for the elements of con-
viction, the Supreme Court has recognized that the defendant
retains a liberty interest in the additional term of years. In
Specht v. Patterson, as noted earlier,153 the defendant was con-
victed of a sexual offense carrying a maximum possible sentence
of ten years. A state sentencing statute made him subject to a
possible sentence of life imprisonment if, in addition to his
crime, he was found to be dangerous or an habitual offender.
The sentencing statute did not create a new crime. Thus, from
Witte's point of view, Specht's entire sentence could be attrib-
uted to the elements of his conviction for double jeopardy pur-
poses. Nevertheless, the Court in Specht held that Due Process
entitled the defendant to the safeguards of a criminal trial
before a judge could impose a separate sentence based on the
sentencing factor. The Specht Court did not allocate the defend-
ants sentence to his conviction for due process purposes. Thus,
Specht establishes that a convicted defendant retains an interest
in not being deprived of liberty beyond the maximum term pre-
scribed for the elements alone.
2. McMillan's 'Necessary Implication." Witte cites McMil-
lan as a second instance when the court allocated the entirety of
a sentence to the elements of conviction. In McMillan, it will be
recalled, a Pennsylvania statute mandated a five-year sentence
for certain felony convictions if a judge, at sentencing, found the
defendant visibly possessed a weapon during the commission of
the felony. Witte, referring to sentencing factors as "offender-
specific information," drew an implication from McMillan:
[Bly authorizing the consideration of offender-specific information at sen-
tencing without the procedural protections attendant at a criminal trial,
our cases necessarily imply that such consideration does not result in
"punishment! for the conduct .... These decisions [double punishment
153. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
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challenges to recidivist statutes and McMillan) reinforce our conclusion
that consideration of information about the defendant's character and
conduct at sentencing does not result in "punishment" for any offense
other than the one of which the defendant was convicted.1
This statement acknowledges that a defendant is entitled to
"the procedural protections attendant to a criminal trial" if the
defendant will be punished for a sentencing factor. Witte indi-
cates the McMillan Court was bound to accord its petitioners
complete criminal due process if the petitioners' sentences con-
stituted punishment for visible possession of a weapon. McMil-
lan, as Witte correctly noted, held that the Pennsylvania statute
punished the defendants only for the elements of their crimes.
The act did not punish them for visible possession, even though
the possession finding triggered a five-year minimum penalty.
McMillan's allocation of the petitioners' entire punishment to
the conviction alone is formally defensible only because, as Mc-
Millan "significantly" acknowledges, the five-year term was
within the maximum punishment already available to the judge
for the conviction alone. Every moment of liberty lost, therefore,
could be attributed to facts found with the protections of full
criminal due process. No sentencing findings were necessary to
deprive the defendants of their liberty. In the case of maximum-
sentence enhancers, however, attribution of the whole punish-
ment solely to the conviction is not tenable. The judge cannot
impose an increased maximum solely on the basis of facts found
with the full safeguards of a criminal trial. Additional factual
findings are necessary. When these findings increase the sen-
tence above what the jury's verdict would permit, the defendant
loses more liberty than the conviction alone authorizes. In the
context of maximum-enhancing statutes, the allocation of a
defendant's entire sentence to the conviction alone represents a
gratuitous refusal to grant the safeguards of a criminal trial to
a defendant's potential deprivation of liberty.
G. When the Tail Wags the Dog: Sentencing Findings that
Require the Due Process Protections of a Criminal Trial
Appellate courts refuse to apply the due process protections
of a criminal trial to "sentencing factors." The courts hold a sen-
tence punishes a defendant solely for committing the elements
of the crime. No part of the sentence punishes a defendant for
the conduct that enhanced the sentence. This is so, courts hold,
154. Witte, 515 US. at 400-01.
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even when punishment is greater than the simple elements of
the crime permit. The Supreme Court in Witte indicated the due
process consequences of this formalistic position: "[B]y authoriz-
ing the consideration of offender-specific information at sentenc-
ing without the procedural protections attendant at a criminal
trial, our cases necessarily imply that such consideration does
not result in 'punishment' for such conduct."5 5 That is to say, if
consideration of sentencing factors resulted in punishment for
the factors, the procedural safeguards of a trial would have to
preface any punishment.
In one extreme circumstance, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated a readiness to abandon its allocation of a sentence solely
to the elements of a crime. In McMillan, the Court noted Penn-
sylvania's mandatory minimum statute gave "no impression of
having been tailored to permit the visible possession finding to
be a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense' 116 The
statute merely raised to five years the minimum sentence which
a judge could impose within a twenty-year maximum. This did
not cross the constitutional line. However, the McMillan Court
indicated the result might be different if the weapon finding dis-
proportionately influenced the sentence. The Court did not indi-
cate when a sentencing factor's influence becomes disproportion-
ate, or how an appellate court can recognize the disproportion.
Perhaps, if Pennsylvania's statute required the weapon finding
to trigger a minimum of fifteen years out of a possible twenty,
rather than just five years out of twenty, the Court would have
held the weapon factor played such a disproportionate role in
sentencing that the tail wagged the dog. It would have acknowl-
edged the punishment was for the aggravating conduct and not
just for the elements of the crime. In Witte, the Court cautiously
reserved the question of whether "the enhancing role played by
the relevant conduct [was] so significant ... that consideration
of that conduct in sentencing has become 'a tail which wags the
dog of the substantive offense, 7
The Court's concern with possible disproportionality shows
the Court is aware its formalism has limits. It will have to
abandon the position that a sentence punishes only the ele-
ments of a crime when reality makes clear the punishment is
for the aggravating conduct. 5 8 Disproportionality is one way to
155. Witte, 515 U.S. at 400.
156. McMillan , 477 U.S. at 88.
157. Witte, 515 US. at 403. The defendant raised no disproportionality claim based
on due process. He relied only on a double jeopardy claim.
158. In practice, disproportionality claims have not been successful. See, e.g., Lom-
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force the recognition. It may be the only way in the case of stat-
utes such as Pennsylvania's. Where the aggravated punishment
(five years) remains within the maximum available for the ele-
ments (twenty years), there may be no way to tell the punish-
ment is really for the aggravating conduct, unless the conduct
disproportionately enhances the sentence. In the case of maxi-
mum-enhancing statutes, however, there is no need to depend
-upon disproportionality to clarify the purposes of the punish-
ment. As soon as a punishment exceeds the term prescribed for
the elements alone, the excess punishment must be for the con-
duct. Otherwise, a court could not impose it. Once it is clear the
punishment is for the conduct, the safeguards of a criminal trial
are required, as Witte necessarily implies.
HI. AN OBJECTION TO DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS FOR MAXIMUM-
ENHANCED SENTENCING
If courts were to acknowledge that criminal trial safeguards
must precede maximum-enhanced sentencing, it may be objected
that a legislature might try to circumvent the demands of due
process by a simple expedient. A legislature could abandon max-
imum-enhancing statutes and revert to traditional discretionary
sentencing. It could expand the maximum penalties available for
the elements alone. For example, instead of penalizing kidnap-
ping by twenty years imprisonment and kidnapping with a
weapon by thirty years, a legislature could punish kidnapping
itself by thirty years. In such case, under the Williams rationale
applied to discretionary sentencing, due process protections
would not attach to the sentencing finding. The defendant could
lose thirty years of liberty on the basis of the conviction alone,
whether or not he used a weapon. If a legislature can escape
due process safeguards by artfully drafting its statutes, why put
the legislature to the trouble in the first place?
In fact, a legislature is unlikely to abandon maximum-
enhancing statutes in an attempt to avoid due process protec-
tions. The graded structure of maximum-enhancing statutes
serves a desirable purpose. It protects less culpable defendants
from excessive punishment when they commit only the unaggra-
vated crime. Maximum-enhancing statutes reserve harsher pun-
ishment for the worse criminal. If a legislature expanded the
penalties available for the simple elements of a crime, it would
bard v. United States, 102 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S.Ct. 2437 (1997). For




create greater penalties than it deems appropriate for the sim-
ple elements merely to avoid complying with the mandates of
the Due Process Clause. Would legislators expose themselves, or
their families, or members of their own electorate, to life impris-
onment for possessing any amount of cocaine, just to deny the
safeguards of criminal trial to those who possess great
amounts? 5 9 The "continued functioning of the democratic pro-
cess" 160 provides some assurance that legislatures will not in-
crease penalties in order to make an end-run around due pro-
cess guarantees. A legislature can harshly penalize serious
criminals without placing less culpable citizens at risk of draco-
nian punishment. It can maintain the graded structure of maxi-
mum-enhancing statutes. But when it does so, the protections of
a criminal trial should attach to the enhancing conduct.
CONCLUSION
Appellate courts have failed to justify the denial of criminal
due process protections at sentencing for maximum-enhancing
conduct. Judicial efforts to analogize maximum-enhanced
sentences to punishment under discretionary statutes fail. An
increased maximum sentence cannot be attributed solely to the
elements. Perhaps in the rush to "lock up criminals," courts
have forgotten that thirty is more than twenty and always will
be. The elements alone do not permit the longer sentence. The
increased portion is punishment for the aggravated conduct that
causes the increase. Characterizing the aggravating conduct as
a "sentencing factor" does not change the reality of what the
punishment is for. A defendant sentenced to thirty years for kid-
napping with a weapon, who could only be sentenced to twenty
years for kidnapping without a weapon, is punished with ten
years for using the weapon. Call the weapon use an "element;"
call it a "sentencing factor.n " Unless the due process protections
of a criminal trial have preceded the finding that caused ten ad-
ditional years of punishment, the finding deprives a defendant
of liberty for criminal conduct without the safeguards of a crimi-
nal trial.
159. "Petitioner does not argue that the range fixed by Congress is so broad, and
the enhancing role played by the relevant conduct so significant that consideration of
that conduct has become 'a tail which wags the dog of the substantive offense." Witte,
515 US. at 403 (quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88).
160. See McMillan, 477 US. at 93 (Marshall, J., dissenting), (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (the democratic process will restrain legislatures from circumventing due process).
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Granted, a defendant may belong to a "subset" of convicts
who deserve additional punishment. Worse criminals deserve
heavier penalties. But criminal trial protections should attach in
determining whether an accused is a worse criminal deserving a
greater penalty than the crime otherwise permits.
Judicial formalism attributes all punishment to the ele-
ments of a crime. Consequently, legislatures can create two
crimes but call them one. The first is composed of the simple el-
ements the legislature defines. Full due process protections ap-
ply to finding those elements. But when a defendant receives a
maximum-enhanced sentence, the court imposes punishment for
a second, greater crime. Formalism denies the existence of the
second crime. It perceives "a mere sentencing factor." Defend-
ants have better eyes. They see they are punished for aggravat-
ing conduct that a court found without the due process of law.

